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I
I am become my enemy whom I could not please and am imagined to be whom I am not for she was not me although her interpretations suited her best should I have no where to lean my face except against the cup of the palm of this hand that hides the life I could not live having fallen young into my mind having fallen further than answers would give an astute reply to martial arms had I words I could confidently write & not be told that they were an excuse I might find the time to warm into less fright. 463 ideological malaise, one crucial to the variations and incongruities of his own philosophy. 9 "How does one compromise oneself today?" he asks in Twilight of the Idols. "By being consistent. By going in a straight line. By being less than ambiguous" (77) . It is 1889, and the semantic reversal of weakness is well underway.
As such, Emmanuel Levinas is far from the first philosopher to use weakness as a philosophical metaphor, although he is arguably unique in generating a hermeneutics of radical passivity, a humanism defined by the self-negation that is a perpetual deferral to otherness. 10 For Levinas stubbornly refuses to give up the category human, instead reworking its heroic terms. Subjectivity itself is Levinas's accursed share; we are all maudits, condemned to the narrow confines of our individual, mortal selves. Be they regretful, anticipatory, or lived, our sufferings are not, for Levinas, "the vicarious but private martyrdom of the beautiful soul" but are rooted in an openness to the incomprehensible Other to whom we are forever obliged, a responsibility Levinas considers pre-originary, exceeding the mandatory, the constitutive. 11 While the foundation of Levinas's thinking was constructed during his internment in World War II, the essays gathered under the title Humanism of the Other were written just before, during, and in the immediate aftermath of the May 1968 uprisings, events that would prove defining for many twentieth-century philosophers, and for the poet Grace Lake. 12 In these writings, Levinas's once-censorious attitude toward art softens, so that he now speaks freely of art as a guide to contemporary spiritual life. 13 More explicitly than in Lake's sonnet, his terms and references are often, rather curiously and persistently, decadent. Levinas envisions ethics as " [t] he swoon of being fainting into humanity" and aligns radical passivity with a willed unhealthiness reminiscent of the "eternal convalescen [ce] " that defines Baudelaire's ideal artistic genius (Levinas, Humanism of the Other, 6). 14 And Levinas directly credits Baudelaire with teaching us "that sensible givens overflow, by their significations, the element where they are supposedly confined" (12). In Rimbaud, Levinas finds more than a self-absorbed poète maudit, asking: "Is it certain that Rimbaud's 'I is another' means only alteration, alienation, betrayal of self, strangeness of self, and servitude to that stranger?" (62) . 15 Levinas claims that the statement "I is another" may well encapsulate the humility of the individual who "puts himself in the other's place, that is, accuses himself of the other's illness or pain" (Humanism of the Other, 62, emphasis in original). If "I is another," that other may well be an "enemy whom I could not please." Regardless, an "expansive capacity" is needed, an infinite hospitality in the face of an always bewildering, possibly antagonistic otherness, no matter what hardship that vulnerability causes the subject.
Aesthetically and philosophically, Humanism of the Other is indebted to the nineteenth century. Not only because Levinas identifies the Nietzschean wake in which he trails, rejecting the pursuit or ownership of truth, equating the end of humanism with the death of metaphysics, and insisting, with historically-informed fatigue on show, that "in our time, metaphysics keeps on ending and the end of metaphysics is our metaphysics" (47). But also because Levinas recognizes the cumulative exacerbation of the problems that Hegel, Marx, and Nietzsche so presciently diagnosed, among them, alienations individual and social. In the previous century, Levinas argues, alienation was believed 464 transitory, even transcendental, a means of "bring[ing] a surplus of consciousness and clarity to the fulfilment of things" (60). By extension and contrast:
Today's angst is more profound. It comes from seeing revolutions founder in bureaucracy and repression and totalitarian violence passing for revolution. Because disalienation itself is alienated in them. In the revolutionary enterprise led with extreme consciousness that nevertheless undoes the vigilant intention that desires it, in action ripped out of the firm hand-the iron fist-that guides it, fails or at least is denounced the recurrence to self, the idea of an ego that is identified in finding itself. The reunion of self and self is a flop. Interiority is not rigorously interior. I is another. Is not identity itself a failure? (60, emphasis in original)
Eliding direct reference to his source-assuredly the "disalienation" of Frantz Fanon's Peau Noire, Masques Blancs (1952)-Levinas then denounces the associated revolutionary program of Les Damnés de la Terre (1961) , stating unequivocally that it replicates the problem it battles against, a charge he extends to identity politics writ large. 16 These are the sorts of claims that underpin a quiet critical fury about the absoluteness of Levinas's otherness, an absoluteness that reinforces an agenda of difference that too easily yields to discrimination. Surely post-identity is as ruthless as the post-humanism that Levinas opposes? 17 This difficulty is compounded by Levinas's refusal of protest at the very moment when civil rights, not to mention liberatory movements of gender and sexuality, are just gaining voice via the vigilant tactics Levinas questions. Like Nietzsche before him, Levinas remains open to the charge of conservatism, of a failure to produce a clear system that results in a systematic failure: his call for a new ethics ironically sustains outdated privilege. 18 "Is not identity itself a failure?" Levinas's question is sincerely posed. 19 And it is posed in turn by participants in and benefactors of late twentieth-century minority influence, among them, Grace Lake's peer and associate, Denise Riley, who asks, "Can anyone fully inhabit a gender without a degree of horror?" 20 But in Humanism of the Other, Levinas falls prey to the very identificatory categories he eschews; when discussing May 1968, he focuses intensively on student involvement, describing these youth as "authentic" and capable of setting aside their "age of transition" for a greater humanity (69). With just a hint of Max Nordau on offer, Levinas insists upon the degeneration of this generation, its too-consuming violence. But admiration tempers condemnation: youth contested the individual conditioned by capitalism, one perceived "as accumulation in being, by honours, titles, professional competence-ontological tumefaction weighting so heavily on others as to crush them, instituting a hierarchical society that maintains itself beyond the necessities of consumption" (76) . 21 In her reading of "the only 'general' insurrection the overdeveloped world has known since World War II," Kristin Ross takes umbrage with student-dominated assessments (May '68, 4). For Ross, "the massive politicization of French middle-class youth in the 1960s took place by way of a set of polemical relations and impossible identifications with two figures now conspicuously absent from this picture: the worker and the colonial militant" (10) . More inclusive than Levinas, Ross nevertheless concurs with his thesis. At its 465 best, 1968 "took the form of political experiments in declassification," affirming "[t]he political opening to otherness," our foundational "debt to the other" (Ross, May '68, 25; Levinas, Humanism of the Other, 76). Paradoxically, the political is most generative when its defining identifications, presuppositions, and hierarchies are jettisoned. Resisting triumphalism, disparaging violence, May 1968 orchestrated an epiphanic vision of humanity briefly lifted from the curse of subjectivity.
III
Then known as Anne Mendleson (later and heretofore, Anna Mendelssohn), Grace Lake was in a car with the American poet Ed Dorn, among others, en route to Paris, at some point in the spring of 1968. Evidence that she crossed the boundaries of the French capital remains scant. 22 Mendelssohn was almost twenty, a student midway into a degree in comparative studies at the University of Essex, a fledgling poet, and a political activist. 23 Founded in 1964, Essex quickly became a notoriously radical university, and in the spring of 1968, was shut down by a student protest against a visiting speaker from Porton Down, Britain's renowned military research institute. 24 Mendelssohn took part in this protest; around this time, she also made an appearance in Jean-Luc Godard's documentary on student unrest in England, British Sounds (1969) . 25 In 1970, still enrolled at Essex, Mendelssohn moved to London, where she wrote for countercultural periodicals and agitated on behalf of squatters' rights. 26 A discrete three-page portion of her fragmented and incomplete roman à clef reflects upon this period. The roman à clef was written over the course of twenty years; this untitled section was likely written in the late 1970s. 27 It is quoted here almost in full:
I thought I had all the answers-that if only everybody else could see then it would be alright. I thought they were wrong and I was right-we were right. The problem is thinking you're right-the world is as it is today because of people thinking they're right and I fell right into that trap-I'm right/you're wrong. Irresistible force meets immovable object. . . . The problem was thinking what's right for myself was right for everyone else, that it would be alright once they change.
I was brought up, like everyone, that certain things are right and certain things are wrong; an ideology, a belief system, a morality, an interpretation of reality. Well that felt all wrong, and I started questioning it, and blaming my misery on the people and the structure trying to make me a certain way. They were providing me with answers, and I questioned those answers, they didn't fit me and I didn't fit them. I was miserable, I saw misery all around me, and I created a new set of answers-only if they change can I be happy, and along with that came a dissection and an analysis of the structure, the misery manufacturing soul destroying State.
I found joy in sharing my questioning with others, giving validity to that questioning, to diving into unmapped, untrodden territory. We lost our way many times-in a world full of answers it's hard to hold a question, when all you know is what feels wrong. Friendships suffered, we all expected of ourselves and each other to have the answer, and we fell into 466 despair and mistrust. The joy turned sour. There was no nourishment for us in the world we were born to, and the initial fuel we had found in each other was burning out. It was a lonely time. And I blamed the State for our alienation-though by that time I was numb from the harm we do to each other.
28
It hit me that our political activities arose out of despair-that I never really believed that the revolution was possible anyway, let alone inevitable. Everything out there was all too big, too complicated, to take on; too anarchic to make any logical sense of. I'd slowly progressed from world politics to city (London) politics to local politics, till finally I was left with the smallest unit-myself. I was terrified of losing that identity, it had been a source of such joy and such sharing. I was terrified of that label being replaced by another-hippy, dropout, sellout, escapist. None of those fitted me. Only no-label-only a new openness to that unmapped untrodden territory . . . I was alone, and could only look to myself, finally, for validity. There was no nourishment anymore in the Revolution as the Solution.
And then I thought I'd found the new solution-the revolution only changes the form of things, is still an interference, an imposition of ideas, the same as it replaces-going in is the only way out, the inner alchemy will bring the outer transformation. At least my new solution wasn't linear, at least it wasn't so blind, so self-deceiving. But still it was a solution, an answer, me thinking I know, that if only every one else could see things like me, be persuaded-still it was a violence. I realised that I can't bear things as they are because I can't bear pain. That I can't bear others' pain because I can't bear my own pain. . . . That really I don't know anything, I don't have a solution, I'm not a great saviour. I'm just me. I'm just a question mark, and the world is my playground.
Solutions are just another form of violence-State violence or revolutionary violence, what's the difference? It takes 2 to play that ball-game and I don't want to play it-though I'm sure I will lots and lots more times because I'll forget, because rules make you feel like you know what's going on, and there's always the hope of winning . . .
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The world, Mendelssohn continues, is irrefutably ugly. Political governance is always violence against the individual; imposing solutions upon others is also "plain violent." She concludes:
And now that I'm not a revolutionary, that I'm not trying to change the world, that I'm not trying to stop the ugliness so that I don't have to feel my pain-I'm overcome by wave upon wave of it. Finally I belong. The pain is me, I am pain. And I am the flower and the hills and the trees, the laughter and the song.
Written twenty years before Mendelssohn's sonnet, this autobiographical passage unmistakably anticipates its terms. A youthful dive "into unmapped, untrodden territory" is thrillingly, then nauseatingly, vertiginous; things fall apart, and questioning peripheries cannot hold in a world so insistently replete with answers. Forward-facing faces have "no where to lean. . . . except against" the immediate self, "the cup of the palm of this hand" that hides as much as it protects. Mendelssohn finds that revolutionary language quickly becomes as conformist, and as violent, as that which it was meant to replace. And in the aftermath of revolutionary fervor, she is thrust painfully upon her own identity, condemned to a subjectivity wracked by irresolvable scrutiny. Is this eternal incertitude the bleak culmination of Nietzsche's philosophy?
Mendelssohn's was an incredibly erudite, voracious mind, one that indubitably engaged in her later years with the thinking of Emmanuel Levinas, among countless others. 32 But what saves her from yielding completely to pain is not her often sardonic sense of humor, not her late night piano compositions, not even the loyalty she charismatically engendered from dozens of admiring, patient friends, associates, readers. Ultimately, Mendelssohn is rescued by the merciful inexorability of Art, by material expanses of page and canvas, by figuration and representation, by language that heals and maims, then heals again. And if we, good modernist inheritors all, mistrust her identification with the natural-"I am the flower and the hills and the trees"-we're right to do so: this bucolic vision is unsustainable, as the utopia of a world where one can simply, restfully be, a world of permissible questions and plainly self-evident answers will always be beyond Mendelssohn's reach. For her, these ambiguities will remain an agony as violent and totalizing as any solution.
IV
Anna Mendelssohn was born in 1948 in Stockport, a town near Manchester. Her father Morris was a respected Labor councilor who fought with the International Brigades during the Spanish Civil War. Her mother, Clementina, was a member of the Manchester International Women for Peace, and took an active part in the family business, a local market stall. The family's Jewish heritage was central, defining: a certificate in Mendelssohn's papers confirms that on the occasion of her first birthday, her parents had three trees planted in Israel in their daughter's name. 33 During World War II, Tina volunteered to care for refugee Jewish children, some rescued from concentration camps, and this harrowing experience was often recounted to Mendelssohn and her younger sister Judi. Though both of her parents were forced to leave school and seek employment in their early teens, they were clearly intellectually ambitious for their offspring: newspaper clippings of Mendelssohn's childhood achievements indicate that she grew up in a cultured household, entering music and elocution contests, performing in local theater productions and the Manchester Youth Orchestra. 34 Mendelssohn was Head Girl at Stockport High School for Girls, and like so many of her generation, became the first member of her family to attend university. . 35 Throughout these decades, Mendelssohn published avidly in journals receptive to experimental writing, among them, Parataxis, Jacket 2, and Critical Quarterly. The presses Methuen, Bloodaxe, and Burning Deck actively pursued or considered book-length editions of her work. From 1990 to 2004, her writing was included in five major anthologies, among them, Denise Riley's Poets on Writing (1992) and Iain Sinclair's influential Conductors of Chaos (1996) . 36 By the late 1980s, Mendelssohn was inundated with invitations to read from Cambridge colleges, London's Southbank Centre, associates in New York and New Hampshire, and, in 1997, the Centre Georges Pompidou in Paris. And none of this literary endeavor even begins to encapsulate the extent of Mendelssohn's visual art. Though she worked with pastel, colored pencil, felt-tip pens, oil, and water color, Mendelssohn's mature artwork is predominantly pen and ink, a medium in which she skillfully blurs the divide between the written and the pictorial. Perhaps most stunning in this regard are her accomplished experiments in an ideogrammatic tradition, which gesture to the work of Pound, Michaux, and Jack Smith of the Kitchen Sink School ( fig. 3 ). Mendelssohn's international modernist credentials are impeccable, a truth exemplified by the writers she translated: during a trip to Turkey in 1969, the poetry of political exile Nâzim Hikmet; from the late 1990s, the work of Gisèle Prassinos, the Surrealist child prodigy "discovered" by André Breton. Her poetry considers revolutionary modernists Anna Ahkmatova, Osip Mandelstam, and Federico Garcia Lorca. And so on.
Two legal battles parenthesize Mendelssohn's adulthood, both of them distinctly marked by her belief, as a young adult, that revolution was the solution. The first was the Stoke Newington 8 trial of 1972, which was, until the recent phone-hacking scandal, the longest criminal trial in British history. Active in the London underground scene from at least 1970, Mendelssohn came into contact with members of the urban guerrillas, the Angry Brigade. 37 Still lacking a well-researched history, and absent from most studies of contemporary terrorism, the Angry Brigade was part of a recognized wave of predominantly middle-class, educated youth who became disenchanted by the inefficacies of democratic protest. Of the same lineage as their infamous counterparts, including the Weather Underground in the United States, the Front de Libération du Quebec in Canada, the Red Brigades in Italy, and Baader-Meinhoff in Germany, the Angry Brigade revolution was comparatively minimal, involving no murders or kidnappings. Their activities included about two dozen small-scale attacks, primarily bombings of largely unoccupied police stations, businesses, embassies, politicians' residences, and a deserted BBC van at a Miss World beauty pageant in 1970.
38 Anna Mendelssohn's fingerprints were discovered on a sheet torn from Rolling Stone magazine found in a bag containing one of those bombs. Fourteen sets of fingerprints were located in the same bag; eleven were never identified. 39 Though Mendelssohn, scarcely twentyfour years of age, pleaded not guilty and defended herself in court with the brilliance and skill of a seasoned lawyer, she was convicted of conspiracy to cause explosions on In prison, Mendelssohn taught her fellow inmates literacy, petitioned for improved conditions, and ran dramatic productions, including a performance of Peter Pan where she cast herself as Captain Hook. These efforts prompted her early parole in 1977. Between 1980 and 1985, Mendelssohn had three longed-for children. In 1983, she changed her name by deed poll to Sylvia Grace Louise Lake. 41 In 1984, she enrolled at the University of Cambridge. Mendelssohn's writing indicates that the late 1970s 472 and early 1980s were relatively happy years. Her love for her children runs palpably through her work; though always impassioned, her poetry in this period has a levity and whimsicality later overtaken by vehemence. This is not to negate the struggles associated with her twin, all-absorbing ambitions to be a parent and a successful student at an excruciatingly paternalistic institution. Poverty exerted its daily grind, as did ill health and the stigma of single parenthood. Mendelssohn believed that the community should help her raise her children; in a different world, this attitude might be incontrovertible. But a couple upon whom she relied heavily desired a better routine, financial assistance, and the involvement of a regulating third party: social services. For a woman who had served time, the scrutiny of her daily machinations by authority figures was a source of pronounced distress; still more worrying was the distinct possibility that the vexed past she had scarcely put behind her might be unearthed in family court, to which Mendelssohn feared returning. When protracted negotiations failed, each side sought legal counsel, and the case went to the Family Division of England's High Court. In 1988, Mendelssohn reluctantly gave permission to have her children temporarily fostered; they were never returned to her care. Mendelssohn's case was harrowing and traumatizing; when it was finished, her lawyer who defended her renounced child custody litigation.
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In the twenty years following the loss of her children, Mendelssohn read, wrote, and drew unremittingly. Now permanently housed at the University of Sussex, her archive is a phenomenal repository of visual art, nearly 800 notebooks, at least 5,000 poems, and a vast array of loose papers, letters, and memorabilia. 43 Throughout these materials, Mendelssohn steadfastly rejects her political past, railing against and identifying with the Left and identity politics, feminism included. She professed her innocence, and her loathing of extremism and violence, until her death in 2009.
V
In 1888, Verlaine asks: "is it not true that . . . the sincere poet will see himself, will feel himself, will know himself damned by the rule of any faction, o Stello?" (Cursed Poets, 79, emphasis in original). The accursed poet is always at odds with himself and others, his spiritual and intellectual transcendence as "poet" undercut by an abjectly slippery slope of contradiction, descended willfully and unstoppably. Eschewing category, existing on the margins of the culture that defines him, the accursed poet deliberately turns away from the good, right, and true in favor of immorality, incertitude, and error. Paradox is his pleasure: he exists to offer himself to masses who reject him; he clings passionately to a mortality replete with self-imposed suffering, and likely brief. Perversion is his freedom: knowing full well what is reasonable, logical, and expected, he behaves foolishly and stubbornly, risking all in the (actively repressed) hopes of literary legacy, a future of inconceivable and ever-deferred accord. The Baedeker of this hapless, exalted journey is Alfred de Vigny's Stello: A Session with Doctor Noir (1832), which pits the idealist poet and titular hero Stello against his psychiatrist, Noir. Stello believes that poetry can change the world, and Noir undertakes to cure Stello of his sentimental malaise. Stello is informed that poets are necessarily social pariahs, figures sullied by affiliation with the predictable mediocrities of waged labor, popular reception, and politics, the latter being the worst culprit in the destruction of poetic genius. Among the extensive exhibition of "melancholy phantoms" that Noir uses to illustrate his arguments we find "Dryden at seventy, dying in poverty and seeking in astrology a vain consolation for human injustice." 44 Against the dreadful fate of the beleaguered likes of Milton or Cervantes before him-a host of writers exiled, overlooked, ill, poor in their lifetimes-Doctor Noir offers a prescription: cultivate a purely perfunctory relationship to politics; work alone, avoiding institutions, affiliations, and audience; and finally, privilege endless contemplation over decisive action (Vigny, Stello, 179-80).
Verlaine's apostrophe to Stello voices his debt to Vigny, whose terms he extends throughout The Accursed Poets (1884, 1888). This essay anthology is interspersed with poems by the condemned rogues upon whom it rhapsodizes: Tristan Corbière, Arthur Rimbaud, Stéphane Mallarmé, Marceline Desbordes-Lalmore, Auguste Villiers de L'Isle-Adam, and Pauvre Lelian (an anagram of Paul Verlaine), with Baudelaire as the absent presence at its heart. 45 Verlaine celebrates their capacity to withstand life's aches, pains, and injustices, as well as their rejection by the masses. Less prescriptive than Vigny, Verlaine is more hagiographic, more oxymoronic: his poets importantly 474 suffer, but transcend that suffering through self-conscious genius; they are "exquisitely perverse, ravishingly chaste" (Cursed Poets, 46). They do not need publications or audiences, but as Mallarmé has both, Verlaine dismisses these worrying tokens of success as "enormous minor detail[s]" (59). Stubborn contrariness is crucial to their combined fates: when poor, they reject money; when rich, they shun an easier life; obsessively, desperately in thrall to their art, they are nevertheless commanding, heroic. Verlaine thus demonstrates how, as we approach the twentieth century, sacrifice is increasingly posited as an authenticating individual choice rather than a societal ritual. Verlaine directly influences Arthur Symons's The Symbolist Movement in Literature (1908) , an anthology that replicates the terms and format of Les Poètes maudits, celebrating madness, excess, and the "long vagabondage" of the lives of Verlaine and his underappreciated, accursed, poetic peers. 46 The ethos of Les Poètes maudits would similarly underpin the philosophy of Georges Bataille, for whom perversion, irrationality, and voluntary sacrifice are viable alternatives to confining necessity and "productive," alienating labor. 47 Bataille turns to figures such as Van Gogh to drag the self-sacrificial mode of the accursed poet from its darkened back alley haven into the light of philosophical validation. For Bataille, Van Gogh's severance of a body part is a literal, marvelous synecdoche of his disengagement with the world entire, a succinct measure of the artist's capacity to rush headlong into the abyss of cultural alienation, a reinstatement of the declining "custom of sacrifice." 48 So pervasive is the motif of the accursed poet that by 1964 Asger Jorn invokes it to decry its twentieth-century efficacy, surely the most obvious of maudit moves. Jorn's portrait of Guy Debord, Lettrist-cum-Situationist International founder, evinces predictable features: poet-philosopher Debord is a member of a group of "bad boys who represent true originality" against whom the public "lashes out in good conscience . . . in order to cut them off permanently from creative activity." 49 Resilient against this severing, Debord refuses celebrity, admirably seeking a difficult and obscure life. And his sufferings and heroism far exceed those of his accursed predecessors:
Paradoxically, the general sympathy toward modernism since the turn of the [twentieth] century, and especially since World War II when it was proclaimed that "the accursed artist no longer exists," represses these creative forces even more radically. The reality of social malediction is wrapped in a tranquilizing and antiseptic appearance of emptiness: the problem has disappeared; there never was a problem. At the same time, the journalistic label of "accursed" becomes, on the contrary, an immediate valorization. It is enough to get yourself cursed, to be all the rage. (Jorn, "Guy Debord," 157, emphasis in original)
Artists are now condemned only to be swallowed entire, assimilated into the culture they work against, writes Jorn, noting that this process originated in ancient sacrificial rituals. An outlaw genius, Debord cannot be neutralized in this manner. Jorn's terms are well over a century old, with a significant distinction: "our hero" Debord differs from Doctor Noir's ideal artists because Debord's creativity promotes action, and by extension, engages directly in politics. 50 These politics would come to fruition in the much-discussed relationship between the Situationist International and the events of May 1968. 51 But in fusing sacrifice with the accursed poet, Jorn is in perfect accord with Vigny, who has Noir tell Stello: "The bloody sacrifice of a few men for many will continue until the end of the world. The nations will continue to buy their salvation forever by the substitution of expiatory suffering" (Stello, 132, emphasis in original). For Vigny, the poet cannot undo this truth, and will almost inevitably suffer from it. And so, at the close of Stello, Noir intones:
The Poet bears a curse upon his life and a blessing on his name. The Poet, apostle of the ever-youthful truth, is a source of perpetual umbrage to the man of Power, apostle of an obsolete fiction; for the one is inspired, the other has at best some power of concentration or some ingenuity of mind. (181) Power is convention, a product of the "ridiculous falsehood" that is "social order" (172). But if "[p]ower is irreconcilable with . . . poetic essence," the poet needs protection (173). And he is infinitely and infantilely fragile, as Noir details: "the Multitude, while carrying you in its arms, looks askance on you as it does on all its children, and from time to time it will throw you on the ground and trample you underfoot. The crowd makes a bad mother" (165). In thrall to a vicious audience and his own indecisiveness, the poet passively awaits his muse. Verlaine would turn Vigny's fragile poetic equivocations into capriciousness, the consequence of a gloriously contemplative will that is weak, perverse, self-serving. Jorn comfortably straddles both camps, exalting the accursed Debord still more for inhabiting a collapsing paradox. Throughout, vacillation and victimhood retain their heroism.
Though damned, the legacy of the accursed poet is pervasive, arguably at work since the fifteenth century, if not before. 52 But its celebrated heyday is the decadent fin-de-siècle, itself delineated by the very paradoxes that define Verlaine's les poètes maudits, not least being the pleasure taken in destruction, decline, and apocalypse. Luxuriousness, vice, and excess are on offer to ground heady, newfound uncertainties of intellection, and, crucially, aesthetic experimentation and indeterminacy. Who will read or care about this new verse? What does it achieve? Beneath Verlaine's fatuous prose, genuine anxiety lurks. Verlaine demonstrates what Nordau will discern as key traits of the degenerate mind: an affinity for digression and "malevolent mania for contradiction" (Cursed Poets, 319). 53 Verlaine's foreword likens "the verses of these dear Cursed ones" to "bronzes from decadent Rome," prompting Verlaine's arch query: "but what does 'decadent' really mean?" (11) . "[T]hey call us 'decadents'" he notes later in the volume, adding, with satiric self-reflexivity superbly on show: "(an insult, between parentheses, implying picturesque, autumnal, with a setting sun, to sum it up)." Against these sullies, Verlaine invokes his damned poets' pursuit of "the impeccable" (87). His vacillations and protestations are admirably consistent; like Nietzsche, Verlaine avowed and disavowed his own decadence. 54 Antipodal thinking allows Verlaine to trounce audiences in a text published with a view to making money, whilst arguing that what will lift the curse of his "admirable poet[s]" is success "-you understand?-" (Cursed Poets, 123). 55 Do we? Can we? The impossible pretense of the apolitical cursed poet is similarly maintained, 476 so that Rimbaud's sympathy with the Paris Commune, and his 1871 trek to participate in the insurgency, is reduced to "some stay in Paris, then diverse, more or less frightful pilgrimages" (Cursed Poets, 60). Poetry is all, and Verlaine's excisions and conflations reflect anthology content, encompassing the poetic terms of, say, Corbière's "Epitaph" of himself, which celebrates a suicide caused by fervor and indolence, a lifelong "[v]igour without force" (17). And finally, Verlaine's decadence allows his male subjects to incorporate femininity, of which the accursed poet-hero's requisite martyrdom, or self-sacrificial bent, is a cogent indicator. This parodic, judicious identification with the feminine by European fin-de-siècle male authors is incisively delineated by Rita Felski, who points to cultivations of languidness and hypersensitivity, to their outward refusal of ("manly") rationalism, utility, and progress. 56 To this list we might add a turn to passivity, indecisiveness, incertitude, and weakness.
Bearing in mind that for Nietzsche, circumlocution and dissidence are all, the genealogy of contemporary weakness he traces in The Anti-Christ (1888) begins with Christianity, which "proclaims a curse" against "intellectual well-constitutedness" that forbids roads to knowledge, and reduces doubtfulness to sin (hence Verlaine's need to celebrate the "immorality" of the accursed poet, a figure unavoidably responsive to the Christian tradition) (Twilight, 169, emphasis in original). For Nietzsche, piety is a contagious illness, infecting "hysterical women and rickety children" who cannot effectively perceive or behave, and are thus ideal "expressions of décadence" (169). Nietzsche's condemnatory linkages between faith, weakness, and effeminacy form the very motto of Anatole Baju's journal, Le Décadent (1886-89): "Man becomes more refined, more feminine, more divine." 57 Key to this strapline is that man chooses to become, whilst woman is. As Felski writes: "Whether hailed as subversive or condemned as pathological, [the fin-de-siècle male's] femininity signals an unsettling of automatized perceptions of gender, whereas feminine qualities in a woman merely confirm her incapacity to escape her natural condition" ("Counterdiscourse," 1099). Lifelong pliancy and self-effacement define woman's condition, as attested by Otto Weininger's bestseller, Sex and Character (1903). For Weininger, womankind has no sense of her own destiny, and cannot "discern fate." She may undertake the extreme measure of overcoming her victimization and objectification by affecting hysteria, but these efforts are feeble and transparent:
[A]t the last moment [women] will kiss the man who ravishes them, and succumb with pleasure to those whom they have resisted violently. It is as if women were under a curse. At times she feels the weight of it, but she never flees from it. Her shrieks and her ravings are not really genuine, and she succumbs to her fate at the moment when it has seemed the most repulsive to her.
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Though anxious, the accursed poet works toward a destiny: the belated recognition of his genius. The accursed woman's fate is violation and condemnation, a "slavery"; her "curse . . . is the evil will of man" but as "handmaid of the devil" it is a fate she deserves and upon which she depends (Weininger, Sex and Character, 279, 299). For Weininger, this curse is defining and inescapable; for Paul Julius Möbius, it is a stick with which to beat the persecuted. A German neurologist believed to have influenced Weininger, Möbius maintained in 1900 that if woman "fails in her duty to the species and insists on living her individual life for herself, she is struck as if by a curse."
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So totalizing is woman's malediction that further attempts at damnation merely affirm a continuum. The elusiveness of this willful execration is why the only woman in Verlaine's anthology, Marceline Desbordes-Valmore, sits so uneasily amidst her unabashedly, triumphantly accursed peers. Distinguished from "negligible bluestockings" and the "proud and therefore male allure" of a George Sand, Desbordes-Valmore gains an entry in the second edition of Les Poètes Maudits because men Verlaine admiresBaudelaire, Rimbaud-have sung her praises (Cursed Poets, 85, 115). Her talent is qualified-"true albeit feminine"-and patronized as "adorable" (85) . DesbordesValmore is celebrated for her self-effacement, as in the maternal anxieties of her poem "Renunciation"; her earnest, polite letting go of reason (which, predictably, abandons her first); and "[t]he entire forgetting of oneself" that marks both her love poetry and her envisioned legacy: "May my name be nothing but a soft, useless shadow, may it never cause fear or pain, may a pauper take it with him after talking to me and keep it long after in his consoled heart" (94). This is not a poet who yields to present-day obscurity with one eye on an assured, future fame. Gestures to decadent paradox can be discerned, as in "Letter to a Woman" that begins, coyly: "Woman, I know, shouldn't write" (89). The speaker justifies her audacity because she writes only to be read by the beloved whilst suffering his absence; the poem culminates in a desire for his wellbeing predicated on the double-edged maxim: "wishing pain on one's blessed other is to hate oneself" (90) . But in the main, Desbordes-Valmore's speakers proclaim their loyalty, long to appease, and are often awash in helpless weeping over immoralities and uncertainties. The self's "weak heart" is excoriated, thus making Desbordes-Valmore "an angel" Verlaine is too "impotent to dissect" (110, 115). By these curiously rapacious terms, Verlaine cannot extend to Desbordes-Valmore the surgery he performs upon his accursed male peers, men distant enough from their own martyrdom that their self-sacrifice becomes either honorable or satirizable. Against the predatory delicacy of Verlaine's critical touch, feminist vanguardists to come will rail: "by instinct, woman is not wise, is not pacifist, is not good. . . . in somnolent periods of humanity she becomes too wise, too pacifist, too good." 60 These words belong to the Futurist Valentine de Saint-Point, and the somnolent period in question is languid decadence. Against the idealizing, imperative curse, Saint-Point demands that "woman reacquire" a longforgotten, productive "cruelty and violence" ("Manifesto," 112).
The historical vanguard to which the accursed poet belongs is inextricable from violence: the avant-garde positions itself at the forefront of a battalion, electing to be first slain. Perceived as pacifist, women have always sat uneasily within this combative milieu, as critics have long discerned. 61 The willful occupation of binaries joyously defines the accursed poet, or he who is hero/martyr, glorified/condemned, absolute/vacillating. This same dualism constitutes a double indemnity for the female: too obviously, whore/Madonna, unified in eliciting ready condemnation. For the female vanguardist, indemnity is augmented: aspiring to the artistic experiments of male-defined vanguards, 478 she also participates within "the feminist critique of sexual ideologies, including the sexual ideology of some of those same avant-gardes" (Suleiman, Subversive Intent, xvii). Debordes-Valmore's poetry challenges male bravado, if only through the suspect persistence of its reverent passivity. But this critique is implicit enough that Verlaine can safely objectify its speaker, neatly sidestepping introspection in the process. Time may have worsened this split: consider Esther Leslie's assessment of Anna Mendelssohn's decades in Cambridge, where "she had some association, tangentially, with that most underground of poetic brotherhoods, the Cambridge Poets, now multigenerational." 62 Multigenerational perhaps, but unigendered: Leslie lists eight affiliates, all male. Less diverse, then, than their Pre-Raphaelite forebears? 63 Avant-garde women who fight fire with fire-Saint-Point among them-often threaten their male peers, and the social order writ large. And assuredly, this is the role undertaken by what is perceived to be the most extreme participant in the aesthetic/political vanguard binary: the contemporary female terrorist. For if there was ever a figure genuinely accursed, it is surely she, as Amanda Third's Gender and the Political attests:
In a manner that parallels Cesare Lombroso's attempt to describe and categorize the female criminal in the late nineteenth century, [twentieth-century] terrorism studies has sought to delineate, and thus contain, the threat of the female terrorist. Terrorism studies discourse seeks to install clear-cut dimorphic boundaries, to categorize, name, and order, and in so doing, to (re)inscribe the limits of lawful opposition. . . . However, these distinctions always operate on uncertain ground, are always on the verge of collapsing. . . . And when the issue of gender is introduced into [these] uncertain hierarchies…the limits of its categories are thrown into sharp relief. . . . [P]recisely because terrorism studies operates with an overarchingly conservative understanding of gender-a framework that constitutes and is constituted by the idea that femininity is obscure(d)-terrorism studies works to continually reproduce the female terrorist as elusive and unknowable. 64 By this lineage, terrorism studies is feebly, deeply reliant upon the tactics of nineteenthcentury intellectual and social history. And the worrying indefinability of the female terrorist is compounded by attempts to cohere two adamantly contrary discourses, both of which have underpinned readings of female protest since the fin-de-siècle. First, the female terrorist is the still more extreme other of her extreme male counterpart, and thus harbors an "unlimited capacity for violence, and . . . embod[ies] unfettered evil" (Third, Gender, 44). But as woman cannot be willful or autonomous, she is only passively involved in terrorism as an extension of her "sexual and emotional affiliations with men" (44) . This latter view informs The Demon Lover: The Roots of Terrorism, where celebrated activist Robin Morgan recounts how "Anna Mendleson, formerly of the Angry Brigade in the United Kingdom" publicly and emphatically acknowledged that the group's activities effected no change. 65 Morgan refuses to accept Mendelssohn's disavowals as genuine criticism, stating instead, with zero evidence to hand, that "they have the ring of disillusion voiced by women betrayed in love" (Demon Lover, 208). 66 With feminists like these, who needs Weininger? An undated letter addressed to Morgan exists in Mendelssohn's papers, deploring this slanderous misuse of her language and identity. 67 The missive remains unsent. Mendelssohn could not have been more acutely aware that any female branded a terrorist is perceived as the ultimate combatant and the least trustworthy victim. Elsewhere, often, Mendelssohn bitterly recounts how she "became known (with much revulsion) as the Angry Brigade girl."
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VI
In 1988, Mendelssohn penned a five-page tract, "One of the Forever Damned?" 69 As the titular question suggests, the roman à clef manuscript continues the quest for certainty and quietude that underpins "I thought I had all the answers." Mendelssohn begins by discussing the study period preceding her final exams at Cambridge in 1986: I want to describe what happened at a crucial juncture. I was very happy at the thought of the coming examinations. It had given me great pleasure to work. It was such a quiet, useful thing to be doing for the children; for myself and for the children. I had never been so happy, regardless of all the problems. The positive part was that having worked hard I had ample material on which to concentrate to produce some good answers, to produce some answers which would have been interesting to write. This happiness is disrupted by a sense that unidentified individuals "were putting spokes in [her] wheel," disrupting Mendelssohn's attempt to give her "children . . . a firm sense of [her] identity" via academic study, a plan that she claims elicited discouragement from female peers. Mendelssohn also perceives a more abstract threat: a man who lurks on the periphery and desires her death; this figure, clad in black, emerging "from the direction of the graveyard" might be literal or figurative, possibly oneiric, certainly nightmarish. She continues:
A young woman had been sent from the North to help me with the children through the intensively important period prior to the examination week. I had it organized in my mind. However guilty I felt about enrolling other people's help I knew that at some point in the not-too-distant future, I should be able to give help in return. But people are impatient. Impatient and Intolerant.
The children's help would not leave me alone to concentrate. I never lost my temper with her but I did try to gently explain that I could not work if she kept sailing into the room and cheerily chatting about all and sundry. Oh it hurt my heart sorely to have to be that woman with no time for anyone else. It would have been so much more beautiful to be able to lie on the rug and play with my relatively new-born baby. . . . But it wouldn't be long before I could play with her, hold her, gaze at her and stroke her cheek. It wouldn't be long before I could draw all three of them on large pieces of cartridge paper, never ceasing to marvel at how they never stayed still for a moment.
People who didn't know what art was about would come and look at my drawings and say that doesn't look like . . . . but they didn't have the faintest idea of the process. To register anything about children is a miracle and a wonder; it is holy, it is innocent, it is life.
What worries me is that I have given away everything before. I have seen my life being taken from me by people who thought that they deserved it rather more than I did. . . . Life is such a learning process that it is hard to say that the uncertainties and fears of yesterday will not reveal themselves as natural and not just some terrible individual idiosyncratic deficiencies which had been branded into you from birth by a malevolent force who had been instructed to deem you one of the forever damned.
A lady over the road who lived in a larger house offered me the use of one of her daughter's rooms. "Install yourself in there" she said "and revise to your heart's content." But after only one day she came to me with the news that her daughter was returning at the weekend and would need her room back.
Excuse me a moment, whilst I ring the bell for the manservant to bring me some tea. It is about four in the morning & I'm parched. . . .
If I really had a manservant I would reach a more formed level in my writing, in my life; I could organise things, dimensions would fall into place, I would be more sure of myself and everyone whom I liked would think me a "lovely person." 70 But no. I rush headlong into desperate sliding anarchy and this really offends my taste. Therefore I find myself offensive. I most certainly do object to this style of writing.
Mendelssohn cannot find succor in her role as an academic parent; like the artwork that does not overtly represent her children, her intellectual aspirations are misunderstood. Her discomfort with realist aesthetics boils over into a rejection of the very prose she writes. She continues with a deprecation of old Communists and their sentimental, nostalgic, "[s]noring" autobiographies, referencing too-limited responses to leftist activity past and present, including the Rosenberg espionage trial in America in the 1950s, and the women of Action Directe who are on hunger strike in a French prison. Her thoughts turn to her father, also an ex-Communist, and his political railings. Trouble and loss pervade these musings, as do unresolved attempts to protect her children's psyches. "[M]usic saved" her own psyche, she observes, recalling instances of going without food to afford the opera. She concludes by returning to writing, remembering how, as a joke, she had once typed, "There is an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile buried in the back garden" and handed it with exaggerated ceremony to her then-housemate, John Barker. "That piece of paper was produced as evidence against me in court" she comments ruefully, noting, by way of conclusion, that her father was right to tell her that writing is dangerous.
"One of the Forever Damned?" is fairly typical of Mendelssohn's later prose, fraught with resistance to an evidently irresistible discursive autobiographical style, and replete with blame of self and others, even as it yields to Marceline Desbordes-Valmore's idealistic "maternal tremblings!" (Verlaine, Cursed Poets, 87). 71 Mendelssohn admires and loathes vanguardists whose fate counters, replicates, or betters her own.
72 She oscillates between indebtedness and entitlement, and these warring affects come to comic fruition as she breaks off from her narrative of lived malediction to imagine herself a gentrified lady author with servants at her beck and call, rather than an impoverished student and single parent reliant upon inevitably temporary generosities. 73 Desires for money, luxury, ease surface throughout Mendelssohn's writings, often not so comically. Mendelssohn resents her political past for preventing ready access to employment, and her experimental proclivities for ensuring that she cannot earn a living by writing or art. Yet she cannot stop writing, justifying, protesting her personal injustices. Mendelssohn might be seen as the emblematic "graphomaniac," a term Nordau lifts from Lombroso and defines as a person with a flaccid grasp on reality and "a strong impulse to write;" these compositions revolve repetitiously around the distressed self (Degeneration, 18). 74 But it is the very acuteness of Mendelssohn's self-consciousness that troubles just such a diagnosis. Mendelssohn loved Auden, a truth that may well be tied to his famous suggestion that "poetry makes nothing happen." Politics devoured Mendelssohn's life; she did not want it to devour her artistry also. Instead, Mendelssohn wanted to wear politics down, grinding and hacking at its monumentality with a view to erecting a poetics free and clear of its contrivances. Paradoxically, this process involved a continual return to the site of the political. Still more paradoxical was Mendelssohn's weapon of choice: she levied an assault on political system with the lived reality of the personal, all in the full and certain knowledge of the feminist maxim that the personal is political, that these realms are inextricable. On the one hand, Mendelssohn's is a self-imposed, irresolvable imprecation exacerbated by a gendered double standard that insisted its resilient, condemnatory way into her vanguardism. 75 Hence Mendelssohn labels the female poet a "poetess," an archaic term easily mistaken as satirically deployed. But Mendelssohn sincerely values this gendered distinction, in part because it does fuller justice to the extent of her malediction. 76 On the other hand, the literary-and poetry in particular-offers a way out of this impasse. For in her finest lyric moments, Mendelssohn brings the inherent anomalies of the accursed poetess to articulate, felt fruition.
"One of the Forever Damned?" is graphophiliac and graphophobic. A more universal language, music saves the psyche. In the academic world to which Mendelssohn aspired, words are savored, definitive answers are requested and performed. In 1986, Mendelssohn proved incapable of this performance, failing to attain her Cambridge degree. For her, words are too perilously open to misinterpretation, to condemnation. "[H]ow close is writing to the Law, how ineffective and too much written in the weight of the law, to the poetess?" she asks. 77 Language evades and excludes Mendelssohn's experience; against these excisions, she develops an infuriated catechistical mode, one that recurs in her untitled poem beginning "This is the reason why I do not conform":
The dangers in writing are inherent. Why it is dangerous to criticize the Establishment Openly. Why what amuses the Establishment is the Bad Use of language and Sex. Why women are discussed in terms of knickers. Why it is important not to lose control Of one's own mind. Why Literature Frames novices. Why Framing is a sociopolitical act. (Implacable Art, 84) This extract is cautionary tale and lived truth: female objectification is relentless, and women critiquing the establishment risk both objectification and obliteration of the rational faculties. Mendelssohn spoke from long experience, as a single example from her youth illustrates. In 1969, or the same year that Mendelssohn took part in Godard's British Sounds at the University of Essex, some students at Cambridge launched what became known as a Campaign Against Assessment. In the culminating move of their Situationist-inspired, year-long protest against the university, these students entered 482 their exam halls in June 1969 and tore up their final examination papers. 78 The gesture was public and deliberately inflammatory, highly symbolic and a genuine breaking of their three-year contract with Oxbridge. These students left the university without degrees in hand; among their number was John Barker, Mendelssohn's housemate who received her missile missive and who ultimately became her dock-mate. In 1972, Barker was convicted alongside Mendelssohn at the end of the Stoke Newington 8 trial.
To fast forward abruptly: in 1989, or two decades after the Campaign Against Assessment, Mendelssohn made a second attempt at completing the final year of a Cambridge degree in English, at completing the very exams Barker tore up. The day of her final exam, Mendelssohn wrote a letter to her friend, Lynne Harries, describing the experi- ence: "In a state of semi-paralysis I did the exams-best two papers uncompleted-. . . Demoralised yet committed answers, too contentious-I'm being hopeful when I say 2/2." 79 Having acknowledged the possibility of failure, Mendelssohn's thoughts turn to Ed Dorn's mentor, Black Mountain poet Charles Olson, whose work she is reading and wants to lend to Lynne's daughter. As in her daily life, in this letter, Mendelssohn's educational ambition is supplanted by her voracious auto-didacticism; the breadth and incessancy of her reading defies encapsulation. 80 But the letter also elucidates the tragedy of an individual resolutely unable to articulate definitive answers, a person who begins, but leaves incomplete, at least three undergraduate degrees. 81 Writing to the poet and theorist Denise Riley in August 1990, Mendelssohn states that her "papers were 'too academically unconventional for the Exam committee to feel (?!) that they were in a fit position to judge. '" 82 In her stunning memoir of Mendelssohn, Harries counters this blasé appraisal:
In the early summer of 1989, [Mendelssohn] told me that the Finals results were posted on the Senate House but her own name was not on the list. This never happens, I kept saying, it's a printing error. It wasn't: she had ignored the questions on her papers and written a tirade against the lack of nursery provision in the university. Later, she petitioned to get the "Fail" changed to "Unclassified," leaving the academic door once again ajar. . . . It is impossible to exaggerate the value she placed on being acknowledged as a serious, scholarly person. ("The Northern Debutante," 17-18) ▲ 
484
The divergence that arose between Barker and Mendelssohn is self-evident: where Barker's Cambridge protest was a sacrifice heroic and historicized, Mendelssohn's was a plea for help in the private, domestic realm she was expected to manage with innate aplomb. Mendelssohn strove to hold aloft drives academic, artistic, parental; she aimed to be Rimbaud and Desbordes-Valmore. Demoralized, committed, contentious, she found the role of une poètesse maudite the only habitable solution. But as this role is overwhelmingly self-canceling, Mendelssohn remained a no-label, a question mark, treating the Cambridge University Library as a second home through her forties and fifties whilst retaining the status "unclassified." Used by permission of the estate.
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VII "Convictions are prisons," Nietzsche intones (Anti-Christ, 172). But equally, freedom exists in irrefutable pronunciations-say, for instance, of one's innocence. This is a contrary truth that Nietzsche's method sustains. Nietzsche considered ressentiment a form of weakness or invalidism, in which the defensive and offensive instincts soften, and "everything hurts." Against this infection there is only one cure, which Nietzsche labels Russian fatalism, or that fatalism without rebellion with which a Russian soldier for whom the campaign has become too much at last lies down in the snow. No longer to take anything at all, to receive anything, to take anything into oneself-no longer to react at all. . . . The great rationality of this fatalism, which is not always the courage to die but can be life-preservative under conditions highly dangerous to life, is reduction of the metabolism, making it slow down, a kind of will to hibernation. 83 Nietzsche claims that when convalescent, he experiences this state, "clinging tenaciously . . . to almost intolerable situations, places, residences, company, once chance had placed me in them" (Ecce Homo, 16). After detailing these unbearable periods of passivity at length, the next section of Ecce Homo turns to war, asserting Nietzsche's love of aggression and his capacity to be an enemy with a strong nature: "to attack," Nietzsche writes, "is with me a proof of good will" (17). An established philosophe maudit, it is via his fundamental discordancy that Nietzsche so comfortably, so prophetically lays claim to being both avant-and arrière-garde. 84 Where avant-gardistes lead a battalion, the arrière-garde brings up the rear, continuing to fight even when defeat is imminent. Where avant-gardism becomes an aesthetic category in the first half of the nineteenth century, the arrière-garde does not come artistically into play until the 1950s, taking root in anxieties about the lost vitalism of the pre-war avant-gardes, and the concern that novelty is now traditional. Pre-World War I, the arrière-garde referred to artists hanging on to bygone traditions political and aesthetic; post-World War II, the arrière-garde began to refer to "artists seeking to renew and defend the avant-garde legacy, to maintain the innovative strength of high modernism, in the knowledge that their efforts are belated and potentially anachronistic." 85 Weak theory propagates encounters with the fullness of one's decline, an experience not unlike Nietzsche's fatalism, of clinging tenaciously, conservatively, to the terms of an all-but-finished battle. And the campaign it defends, and to which it returns, originates with decadence. This truth may be site-specific: in Italy, the birthplace of il pensiero debole, what Anglophones call modernism is decadentismo. 86 But well beyond nomenclature, the defining terms of weak thought replicate decadent mores with stunning precision: dissolution, finality, resignation, weariness, passivity, invalidism, contagion, nihilism-all conduits to novelties aesthetic and intellectual, even as past tradition is held dear, sustained. Paradox frames weak theorists' emphatic refusal of emphatic claims. 87 And decadence is further discernible in weak theorists' argument-objectionably privileged at best-that a society that has at last overcome material necessity can revel in the luxuries of incertitude and experimental aesthetics. 88 In "Languor," this very view prompts Verlaine to align fin-de-siècle decadence with the decline of the Roman Empire. Verlaine and Nietzsche have the temerity to openly recognize and disavow their decadent affiliations. This temerity waned through the twentieth century, where Marxists, Vorticists, and Futurists openly railed against the same. Decadence was an insult, even as theorists increasingly refuted mastery in favor of a feminine passivity, heroizing martyrdom, or the über-decadent mandate of les poètes maudits. 89 Derided, decadent innovation determines contemporary vanguard practice in a manner that goes peculiarly unacknowledged, as though twentieth-century critics continued swallowing wholesale Marinetti's self-serving, anxious rejection. 90 Of late, Vincent Sherry usefully expounds upon the persistent suppression and extraordinary influence of decadence upon the very modernist writers that dismissed its preoccupations, but Five Faces of Modernity (1977) is surely the forerunner in this regard, as author Matei Calinescu insists upon the virtual interchangeability of decadence and the vanguard. 91 For Calinescu, decadent intellection precipitates the modernist thematic of crisis, and in turn, an all-defining "unbounded relativism" (Five Faces, 5). For Calinescu, today's countercultural "questioning of unity" is a decadent construct (312). Avant depends upon arrière. But weak theorists maintain that theirs is "a philosophy that some old-timers have erroneously tagged 'decadent' and 'crepuscular'" when it is in fact "a positive, life-affirming, creative approach to life." 92 Easily incorporating both of these factions, decadence may prove more willfully oscillatory than weak theory itself.
In an untitled poem, Mendelssohn recounts the experience of "a woman [who] cries in the night between her innocent shoulders" even as "her mind was met by texts that held her." 93 Seeking reassurance, safe containment, this woman is at least partly grounded; "she cannot dive, there is no pool, she wants to stay in the rain today." (Perhaps she too has already plummeted, "fallen young into [her] mind"?) Avoiding diagnosis, because psychiatrists would "be poets if they weren't so rich," "she tells the gulleys she left behind what it is to show that / confidential innocence is not universally exciting." Furrows worn and well-traveled, gullies are also sharp knives, weapons. To these emblems of her past, this woman proclaims a secret, unacknowledged innocence, one that sets the world alight for no one but herself. The longing for an impossible absolution is comically scabrous, urgently palpable. Recognizing herself as a humble member of the "country folk worn down over time"-"it's country fairs we share"-the speaker moves beyond even this rural margin, running "off into the mists by the swamps where the convicts sank." Eschewing the brand of the precocious, controversial artist, the enfant terrible, she takes on the guise of the feral "enfante sauvage," one who "read[s] by the light of the moon." In this embittered, enforced retreat, "Oscar's spirit brushed her every movement into the powers of decadence." The next, concluding line reads: "she learnt the merits of dissonance & watched the fairs fade." The overt contrariness of Oscar Wilde, an artist who endured injustice, imprisonment, and was ultimately (almost) universally exonerated, sustains this enfante sauvage, permitting the past-and its painful ambiguities-to momentarily recede.
VIII
Limitlessness as necessity risks obsession, "pain without end, the fall into bottomlessness." 94 Signs exist of an emergent weariness with inexhaustibility. Charles Altieri argues that some key avant-garde mandates-semantic indeterminacy, a reliance upon the dogged continuities of readerly or audience reconstruction-replicate the social norms they challenge, affirming, for instance, the capitalist promotion of false autonomy and consumerist choice. For Altieri, the endlessness of aesthetic interpretation is not 488 necessarily positive, and he wonders if criticism "can [now] only be 'authentic' if it constantly undoes itself." 95 While Altieri advocates a revaluation of the too-easily dismissed arrière-garde, Alain Badiou turns to revolutionary successes of 1848 to advocate contemporary political insurrection as an escape route from the confines of our painful, intervallic period, one where we appear reduced to witnesses of " [t] he continuation, at all costs, of a weary world." 96 Where Vattimo castigates pronouncements of critical and political ideologies as "partial thinking," the vanguardist Anna Mendelssohn writes about the intolerability of studied neutrality in a poem sublimely entitled "never beiger": I read of impassability & live in the interface between received ideologies which are both insulted and form armies as the dreadful milk evaporates up the walls the road poisonous to walk much distance upon 97 Against all battalions, be they avant or arrière, Mendelssohn posits the intractability of necessity, shamefully wasted sustenance, incapacitated free movement. The next line insists on stance-taking: "I am full of opinion which is the extraneity." The speaker is a foreign element, an outsider, doggedly prepared to assert herself, if dogged by selfconsciousness.
Vanguards aesthetic and political do not always intertwine, but against Verlaine's indoctrination, le poète maudit Rimbaud is admired for emblematizing this symbiosis, even as we remain ignorant of the details of his Parisian activism. 98 Similarly, Mendelssohn's opening speech in the Stoke Newington 8 trial carefully delineates her political and artistic vanguard activity up until that point, whilst curiously eliding mention of a journey to France in spring 1968. 99 If Mendelssohn failed to arrive in Paris, this "failure" is consistent with her inability to complete degrees or to answer posed questions directly. In Implacable Art, she mocks "any who want poems to give them answers" because "a poem is not going to give precise directions / you mustn't touch the hiding places. / they address a different world / where trees are decorated with diamonds" (34). Mendelssohn's love of art, as for the decadents, was rooted in its capacious incompatibilities: in artifice, the experiential, extreme intolerabilities of ambiguity could affirm, could co-exist. So it is that Mendelssohn uses the personal to decimate the political, as when she alludes, rather often, to the Situationist International slogan, "Sous les pavés, la plage."
100 Consider "eulogy":
she smoothes her skirt to show her ineffectual language unhappy to be english speaking to the interesting sound of spoken greek but what could she say? this is music in comparison to what I speak & that is really the crux of her problem she feels another language not this one she is impressed. she wants to learn these new inflections. but will she be seized a traitor to the nation he sings a sentence between talking them it goes soft, it asserts, it narrates & faces change, animate, picking up on each others' words it sounds a bit italian, a bit spanish, the girl who is with them told me that that was because they were speaking mediterranean.
The next page reads:
I could see the sea & hear the towns where the sea was calm & the buildings white in the distance. closer up were the boats it has turned my desire around I have travelled miles these people have brought liquid vowels in trowels loading them from beaches & ports have delivered thoughts of mediterranean timing.
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Accursed poet Corbière's "Epitaph" proclaims that its speaker is "Too much his own to be able to suffer" and credits his demise to his unanticipated, yet foreseen "succes[s] as a failure" (Cursed Poets, 18). Mendelssohn admired Corbière, but her speaker mourns a lived past without his comic assuredness; she fears seizure, the brand "traitor," sentencing. 102 Language is dangerous, targeted; in its diversity, language is unstoppably appealing. Within this poem, a shoreline demarcates. Elsewhere, in what may prove her magnum opus, "Silk & Wild Tulips," Mendelssohn describes how "the beach was too large for reality." 103 In the aftermath of "eulogy," the poet travels miles to find "people [who] have brought liquid vowels / in trowels loading them from beaches" (Mendelssohn, "Silk"). The beach is uncontainable, liquid, sustained by manipulation and delivery; it is not an idealized expanse, a utopia just beneath the thin veneer of civilization, tantalizingly within reach. What it might be, however, is a sounding board, an embankment. "And now that I'm not a revolutionary," Mendelssohn writes in the late 1970s, now "that I'm not trying to change the world . . . so that I don't have to feel my pain-I'm overcome by wave upon wave of it." In "eulogy," the shoreline delimits and absorbs, and is defined in turn by a series of buildings: blank, rectilinear constructions. For Mendelssohn, the freshness of a clean sheet of paper is a requisite, proximate distance, an inviting port for syllables and thoughts. Necessary paths, necessary boundaries, "those thin lines of thought onto paper," she writes in a letter in 1987, "are my raisons d'être." 104 
